Existentialism, which arose in France under Nazi occupation, has been an appealing philosophy for writers and intellectuals 2 In various analyses of state politics, the questions of lying and politics are often seen in close proximity to one another. Hannah Arendt, in "Truth and Politics," establishes a firm relationship between the realm of politics and the act of lying. She writes: "No one has ever doubted that truth and politics are on rather bad terms with each other, and no one, as far as I know, has ever counted truthfulness among the political virtues" (Between Past and Future 227). In Crises of the Republic, she further claims that secrecy "and deception, the deliberate falsehood and the outright lie used as legitimate means to achieve political ends, have been with us since the beginning of recorded history" (4). In his essay on Hannah Arendt, "History of the Lie: Prolegomena," Jacques Derrida maintains that political history as well as any history would not be possible without at least the possibility of the lie, as he writes that "there would be no history in general, and no political history in particular, without at least the possibility of lying, that is, of freedom and of action" ("History of the Lie" 155). Thus, in the words of Joseph Kronick, "truth remains bound to its spectral relationship with the lie" (1002). In this essay I also want to examine how these two terms, truth-speaking and lying, often remain in close proximity to one another rather than forming mutually exclusive polarities. South Africa by using such Sartrean terms as "being in situation." Brink writes:
In the fullest sense of the word [this] is an experience of being in situation. Which is something radically different from "being within the system"! In fact, only by being not only in situation but, if it is at all possible, sur place, can one make sure that the system is exposed, countered and eventually shattered. (35) It is Brink"s political obligation to reveal and expose the apartheid system and use his writing as action in the world.
Brink acknowledges that as beings in situation we are challenged to transcend our historical circumstances. This is why we are bound to be free. We are free to choose. Brink further states that the system is [to be] exposed … in the name of that truth all writers go in search of, that freedom which can only be born from the rebellion against unfreedom, and that justice of which as a barefoot boy I caught a glimpse that can never fade-provided one commit oneself unconditionally to the need to state it, and restate it, and state it again, and again, and forever.
For the committed author the concept of freedom originates from choice. Brink"s writing bears much in common with other existentialist writing, which, according to Peck, emphasizes the necessity to act: "one is free to choose, and indeed condemned to such freedom; therefore one defines oneself by action, and good faith would seem to demand forms of action that are capable of enlarging human life and freedom" (73).
For the writer, freedom and the choice it involves entail the action of committed writing, a critical act aimed at enabling other subjects to reflect critically on and actively challenge their own unfreedom.
In Theodor Adorno"s critical discussion of political commitment in art, Adorno challenges representational strategies that attempt to directly reflect social conditions without complicating the relation between forms of art and reality. Adorno"s critique is useful in relation to the discussion of resistance literature in the South African context. Brink"s notion of the role of the artist who goes against unfreedom in his writing in order to reveal social ills becomes complicated if we follow Adorno"s criticism of Sartre"s concept of committed art. 7 For Adorno, committed art is not free and it does not arise from the freedom of choice; rather, such art is bound to remain consigned to the logic of the society it wishes to critique. Adorno writes that "[t]he notion of a "message" in art, even when politically radical, already contains an accommodation to the world" ("On Commitment II" 65).
Furthermore, he states that "works of art that react against empirical reality obey the forces of that reality" ("On Commitment II" 62). Such forms of art make compromises, as they fail to break free from the empirical reality in which they originate ("On Commitment II" 62). For Adorno, art is not to mime empirical reality, but to follow its own rules of creation. 8 7 Sartre"s understanding of committed art has since received a lot of criticism for compromising its artistic forms, but it was not really challenged before Adorno"s two-part essay "On Commitment." In support of Sartre"s position on engaged art, Robert Pickering writes in his article "Témoignage and Engagement in Sartre"s War-Time Writings" that "literary values alone were never conceived to be the fundamental grounding of Resistance writing, attuned as it is to a complex intermeshing of political and ideological preoccupations, and to their relationships with cultural dissemination and advancement" (309). literature in English … are refracted through an elaborate rhetoric of urgency that strains to effect a secular closure between the word and the world precisely to safeguard the ethical claims of South African literary culture" (368). Therefore, in order to remain ethical, literary style cannot complicate the relationship between the sign and its referent-the word and the world. Such an approach assumes that ethical work is only possible through the modes of mimetic writing.
This approach further implies that non-mimetic writing is somewhat apolitical. It follows that any author swaying from mimetic writing and from clearly stated political standpoints-i.e. not overtly enough positioning him/herself against the regime in power-is accused of apolitical, escapist and often reductionist writing. Such readings of literature are supported by Mothobu Mutloatse, for instance, who argues that "any writing which ignores the urgency of political events will be irrelevant" (qtd. in Seroke, 305 . See also Bethlehem 367).
In its emphasis on mimetic realism, as Benita Parry has noted, such an approach "acts to exercise a constraint on literary production" (13). Parry continues to state that "oppositional discourses quickening liberation energies can reside in spaces where there is no obvious correspondence between image and social message, and in articulations which do not register a literal relationship of word to social referent" 10 This, nevertheless, does not mean that art is not "social." In the opening pages of Aesthetic Theory, Adorno claims that art should be both autonomous and fait social; it does this by resisting polemicizing and, through its form, making its relationship with society legible. Adorno writes: "The unsolved antagonisms of reality return in artworks as immanent problems of form. This, not the insertion of objective elements, defines the relation of art to society" (6). Adorno has stated various times that "Cultural criticism finds itself faced with the final stage of the dialectic of culture and barbarism. To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric" (Prisms 34). Thus, art after the Holocaust could not be the same; it had to be reconfigured. The term "lyric poetry" can be interpreted here as a relatively wide concept including literary representations that seek to represent mimetically the Holocaust by sympathizing with the victims, and thereby domesticating the horror of the event and creating a consumable pathos.
In his essay "The Modernist Event," Hayden White also writes about representations of the Holocaust in the following manner: "With respect to the question of how most responsibly to represent the Holocaust, the most extreme position is … [that of] those who hold that this event is of such a kind as to escape the grasp of any language even to describe it and of any medium-verbal, visual, oral, or gestural-to represent it, much less of any merely historical account adequately to explain it" (30, italics in the original). Therefore, a disaster like the Holocaust goes beyond any form of representation; it can neither be explained nor comprehended. White broadens his discussion beyond the specific context of the Holocaust to suggest that "modernist techniques of representation provide the possibility of de-fetishizing both events and the fantasy accounts of them which deny the threat they pose, in the very process of pretending to represent them realistically" (32). Coetzee"s literary style, which avoids mimetic realism, the main representational strategy associated with "resistance literature" of the 1980s, has received much criticism in the context of South African literary politics, a politics which sought to expose the truths of a corrupted society. Coetzee"s anti-mimetic writing was strongly criticized for its perceived ahistoricism, particularly by Abdul R. JanMohamed in his article "The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in Colonialist Literature" and Paul Rich in his article "Apartheid and the Decline of the Civilization Idea." Since then, some critics, including David Attwell, "have endeavored to rehistoricize Coetzee"s fiction by emphasizing its discursive relevance to the time and place in which the novels were produced" (Durrant, "Bearing Witness" 431). Rehistoricizing Coetzee"s work nevertheless runs a risk of failing to do justice to his ambiguous style. Attwell has also acknowledged this and states that the attempt to take Coetzee"s books "back into their context" means also reading them "against the grain" ("Editor"s Introduction" 8). This attempt to re-historicize Coetzee"s work also indicates a partial acceptance of criticism that sees his work as ahistorical. My reading of Coetzee"s fiction is more aligned with Durrant"s analysis, as he maintains that "Coetzee's commitment to the autonomy of his art is precisely that which ensures the political force of his novels, that his novels are only able to engage with the history of apartheid precisely by keeping their distance" ("Bearing Witness" 432).
13 In an interview with David Attwell, Coetzee states: "I am not a herald of community or anything else, as you correctly recognize. I am someone who has intimations of freedom (as every chained prisoner has) and constructs representations-which are shadows themselves-of people slipping their chains and turning their faces to the light" (Doubling 341). Coetzee, unlike Brink, does not see writers as free subjects able to choose. Rather than seeing an apartheid society as It is an infectious logic from which there seems to be no escape, unless the author takes his or her distance and establishes the rules of his or her own artistic representation. 
